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WHY DOES HISTORY MATTER TO THE SCIENCE STUDIES 
DISCIPLINES?  A CASE FOR GIVING THE PAST BACK ITS FUTURE 
Steve Fuller 
 
 
Anyone who doubts the problematic nature of the disciplinary boundary separating 
history and philosophy should consider the chequered reputations of Hegel and 
Comte, neither of whom recognised a clear boundary. Science and technology studies 
(STS) provides yet more challenges to that boundary today, a radical version of which 
will be explored in this essay. STS is normally associated with ‘social 
constructivism’, which when applied to history of science highlights the malleability 
of the modal structure of reality. Specifically, changes to what is (e.g. by the addition 
or removal of ideas or things) implies changes to what has been, can be and might be. 
After exploring this point, most notably with regard to Latour’s account of Pasteur’s 
scientific achievement, I identify two polar attitudes towards the world’s modal 
malleability: over- and under- determination, which correspond, respectively, to a 
belief in the inevitability and the precariousness of science as a form of knowledge, 
which I illustrate in terms of Popper’s and MacIntyre’s contrasting visions of a post-
human world. The distinctness of the two positions is an artefact of the cordon 
sanitaire that exists between the history and the philosophy of science, which is made 
at the cost of not giving historical figures full voice as constructors of reality: They 
are either quarantined to a foreign realm called ‘the past’ by the historian or 
selectively assimilated to an imperial present by the philosopher. But neither the 
historian nor the philosopher has her own sense of the modal structure of reality 
challenged by the historical figure. In the second half of this essay, I explore what 
such challenges might look like, were they taken seriously, say, via a renewed 
commitment to ‘re-enactment’ as a humanistic methodology. I focus especially on the 
case of the 13
th
 century Franciscan friar, Roger Bacon, who has been alternatively 
seen as a mad medieval or a proto-modernist. To give Bacon full voice would involve 
setting aside these two stereotypes in favour of taking the future that he envisaged as a 
normative benchmark for judging our own world. 
 
 
1.  Science as the Fine Art of Making Up the World as One Goes Along 
 
It has become customary to characterize the relationship among the three main 
disciplines that constitute science and technology studies (STS) – history, philosophy, 
and sociology of science -- as follows: History supplies the raw material that is 
initially understood in terms of sociological categories, which philosophers then 
‘justify’ in the relatively limited sense of offering a recurrent rationale that the 
historical agents could accept as their own (Fuller 2006: chap. 3). Daston and Galison 
(2007) exemplifies the sort of work that results from this process. The book collects a 
variety of scientific practices over the past three centuries, organizes them according 
to disciplines and traditions, from which specific conceptions of ‘objectivity’ (e.g. 
correspondence, independence, etc.) are then teased out. There is no attempt to 
provide a grand philosophical – or, for that matter, sociological – narrative that 
supervenes on the history. Rather, philosophy and sociology are deployed simply to 
find interesting patterns in the historical detail. Sometimes this approach is presented 
as a revival of Neo-Kantianism because it appears to presume a correspondence 
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between the organization of academic disciplines and the structure of domains of 
reality (cf. Fuller 2007: chap. 2).  
 
My own version of social epistemology construes the tri-disciplinary relationship 
rather differently, but in a way that can also be explicated in Kantian terms. Consider 
the organization of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Here the human subject is cast as 
an epistemic speculator who is less concerned with insuring what she already thinks 
she knows than leveraging it into higher-order modes of cognition, ideally to achieve 
universal knowledge. This was certainly how Kant’s immediate idealist successors 
(Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) read him, which in turn inspired them to develop 
philosophies that systematised all knowledge into curricula designed to empower free 
persons. One might then think of history, sociology and philosophy as corresponding, 
respectively, to the three levels of Kant’s architectonic of mind: the manifold of 
experience, the categories of understanding, and the regulative ideas of reason. In 
contrast to Daston and Galison (2007), for whom the objects of history are 
‘determined’ by being captured in discrete kinds that are both sociologically salient 
and philosophically meaningful for the contexts in which they normally appear, the 
idealists saw history itself as increasingly ‘determined’ in the sense that objects with 
distinct historical origins are consolidated into principles of increased scope that then 
enable access to new domains of objects. ‘Science’ is thus not a property of particular 
disciplines but rather a form of knowledge that emerges through what Kant’s first 
major English follower, William Whewell, called the ‘consilience’ of different 
knowledge bases, with the ultimate aim of knowledge of all things for all people.  
 
A feature of this idealist reading of Kant, which I also endorse, is its ‘dialectical’ 
character, such that as science opens up new cognitive horizons, it also reconstitutes 
its understanding of how it got to be where it is. Science is not simply about the 
growth of knowledge and/or power but equally about the periodic recalibration of the 
standards by which that growth is measured. This thesis is naturally read as a radical 
form of social constructivism, and it corresponds to the ‘Orwellian’ function of Whig 
history in Kuhn’s understanding of scientific pedagogy (Fuller 2000: introduction). 
The difference between Kuhn’s and my own take on Whig history is that I see it less 
as a ‘noble lie’ that scientists need to motivate themselves and a potentially sceptical 
public than as a publicly owned narrative whose collective contested performance 
defines the sense in which both scientists and lay people live in a common world. 
(Kuhn, for his part, is happy to have scientists and historians of science live in 
separate worlds, each left to their own historiography.)  
 
To be sure, the very idea that social construction might extend backward as well as 
forward – that we might ‘change the past’ -- easily offends epistemological 
sensibilities, as Bruno Latour learned when he took symmetrical changes in time to be 
a consequence of the claim that microbes did not exist before Pasteur. In effect, 
Latour wanted to argue that over time Pasteur not only cleared the way for today’s 
understanding of the nature of disease, but also successfully backdated the historical 
record, as Winston Smith was employed to do in 1984’s Ministry of Truth, to make it 
so that microbes have always existed (Latour 1999: chap. 5). At first glance, to call 
this ‘changing the past’ may seem to be an imprecise way to talk about the striking 
but not so unusual fact that we could come to know that people in the past radically 
misunderstood important features of their own world (Hacking 1995: chap. 17). 
Without denying the truth in this observation, nevertheless the emphasis that Latour 
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places on the ongoing nature of the backdating task is striking. When he refers to 
Pasteur’s success in terms just as triumphalist as those of any Whig historian, he is not 
talking about the enduring truths that were revealed by Pasteur’s discoveries but the 
tremendous amount of work across societies around the world that has been unleashed 
as a result of those discoveries. On this basis, Latour has provocatively argued that 
science is the most effective form of politics, if only because scientific discoveries 
serve as market signals or strong attractors in terms of which many others reorient 
their activities with the minimal application of external force (cf. Fuller 2007: chap. 
3). 
 
When students of post-Einstein physics want to do a reality check on ordinary usage, 
they observe that one can only change the present, not the past or the future. The 
statement shocks only because by ‘the present’ the post-Einsteinian incorporates 
much of what is ordinarily counted as the past and the future. Specifically, ‘the 
present’ is not simply the ‘point in time’ that the speaker happens to inhabit but a 
possibility space that extends both backward and forward in time and serves to 
stabilise the identity of the present as ‘contemporaneous’. To register a change in how 
things are ‘now’ is ipso facto to alter how things could be, where ‘could’ is a measure 
of ‘feasibility’ in the broad sense, that is, how things might have got to be where they 
are now and, in light of that, how they might go in the future.  
 
For example, our sense of the present involves the recognition both that Kant died 
more than 200 years ago and that his ideas remain – and are likely to remain -- an 
important voice in philosophical discourse. Were we to deny Kant’s status as a virtual 
contemporary in this way, we would be effectively living in a different world, one 
whose past, present and future is bounded differently. In other words, our sense of 
Kant’s continuing contemporaneity presupposes that the dates of his life (1724-1804) 
are an irrelevance: Kant might as well be living now, as far as our treatment of him is 
concerned. This is striking, since we routinely discount people by declaring them to 
be mere ‘products of their time’, by which we mean that their ideas lived and died 
with their bodies. In contrast, we treat Kant as (if he were) capable of resurrection 
because his ideas live on in us. Of course, at some point Kant may come to be seen 
exclusively as a product of his time, in which case our sense of the present will have 
changed substantially.  
 
However, Latour’s Pasteur example reminds us that a change of this sort would be no 
mere exercise in word magic. Given Latour’s own self-understanding as an empirical 
investigator with no normative agenda, it is left to me to recast the Pasteur case as 
embodying a two-pronged strategy for world-changing:  
(1) that any claim to have changed the present – as in the case of Pasteur  -- 
should be understood more as a promissory note that is being paid off at a 
variable rate than a fait accompli. In that case, the usual way of telling the 
history of science misleads by giving too much credit to the work of the 
originator and not enough to those who pave the ways leading both to and 
from the work;  
(2) that changing the present is tantamount to changing the modal structure of 
history. I have likened this task to history’s ‘time-travelling’ function, in 
which world-historic discoveries such as Pasteur’s systematically re-wire the 
inferences drawn from evidence, so as to alter our sense of what is plausible 
and hence ‘realistic’ (Fuller 2010a). The extent to which we live in the same 
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world is a function of the overlap in our modal judgements. Thus, insofar as 
people continue to differ about the role of microbes in the cause and spread of 
disease, the Pasteurian revolution remains unfinished, or more precisely, 
subject to ‘uneven development’.  
 
I differ from Latour in stressing the normative character of such re-wirings of history. 
Latour often writes as if history properly told would simply enumerate the entities 
added to the world, a position he once dubbed ‘irreductionism’ (Latour 1988). Thus, 
Pasteur first introduces microbes in late 19
th
 century France, and then his followers 
need to insert them backwards and forwards in history. In contrast, I take more of a 
balance sheet approach, whereby each entity added incurs costs, as the properties of 
already acknowledged entities need to be redistributed, resulting in some ontological 
restriction, if not outright elimination (Fuller 2007: chap. 3). This is in line with what 
Imre Lakatos (1981) called ‘Kuhn Loss’, namely, that the introduction of new entities 
in the wake of a scientific revolution invariably undermines the plausibility of some 
of the most distinctive entities posited by the previous paradigm by depriving them of 
a semantic role in the dominant causal narrative -- case in point: aether, in the wake of 
Einstein’s revolution in physics. At best, they become fictions, derivatives of the real. 
Thus, angels have not been erased from historical memory entirely but shunted into a 
theological ghetto that requires some other entity (e.g. a textual or a neural trace) for 
their realization, since they now lack a free-standing existence. In effect, I treat 
ontology as a species of political economy, whereby ‘reality’ consists in living on a 
budget that requires tradeoffs between various possible entities (and their associated 
expertises), none of which can be fully realized if, as Latour wishes, they would all be 
realized to some extent (Fuller and Collier 2004: Postscript).  
 
A host of metaphysical queries may be raised about the nature of this ‘ontological 
budget’ that cannot be dealt with here. But suffice it to say, the modal character of 
reality presupposes that we are normally oriented to such a budget, which is captured 
by the idea that not everything is possible at a given time and place. What is possible, 
under which conditions (which is to say, at what cost to whom and to what benefits 
and harms), constitutes the modal structure of the causal order. This issue is of special 
relevance to the history of science due to philosophical claims concerning science as a 
universal form of knowledge. Is science a robust form of inquiry that could be 
independently invented under various conditions, or a relatively unique approach to 
the world that leads a rather precarious existence?  Here our counterfactual intuitions 
pull in opposing directions: on the one hand, science could emerge even were the 
world radically different; on the other, even a relatively slight change to the world 
would eliminate science altogether.  
 
In Fuller (2008b), I cast this distinction in terms that figure in the rest of this essay -- 
between overdetermination and underdetermination in history. Roughly put, the 
former captures a sense of historical necessity that overcomes events and the latter a 
radical contingency that succumbs to events. It is worth stressing that the same 
historical evidence can be used to support both alternatives. The two positions part 
company over how this common evidence base – for our purposes, the actual history 
of science -- is integrated with other evidence that is used to establish what has been 
and will be possible. This integration task, in turn, has a strong normative dimension 
that is bound to be controversial because of its potential policy implications. For 
example, by the logic of underdetermination, insofar as we continue to value science 
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as it is done, and we trace it to events that are considered ‘accidents of’ or ‘unique to’ 
European history, we are providing prima facie grounds for a certain kind of cultural 
imperialism. In effect, we are claiming that science requires a rather specific cultural 
support system that needs to be artificially maintained in order to realize its universal 
aspirations. These claims would be more openly discussed – and contested – if what 
in the next section I call a cordon sanitaire did not exist between the history and 
philosophy of science, which involves not only turning the two counterfactual 
intuitions into default disciplinary postures (i.e. historians as underdeterminationists 
and philosophers as overdeterminationists) but also dividing the labour between the 
two disciplines in terms of temporal horizons (i.e. historians as facing backward and 
philosophers as facing forward from the present).  
 
 
2. Removing the Fence that Makes Historians and Philosophers of Science Such 
Good Neighbours: Start by Imagining the World without Us  
 
In my philosophical youth, at the height of the Cold War, I was very much taken by 
two contrasting images of the post-apocalyptic epistemic world: an optimistic and a 
pessimistic one. The former, courtesy of Karl Popper (1972), imagined that a new 
intelligent species could re-create our civilisation by accessing the ‘objective 
knowledge’ contained in our libraries and databases after what presumably would 
have been neutron bomb-based holocaust. The latter, due to Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1981), envisaged that such efforts would be more like those of today’s 
archaeologists, who, even were they blessed with a complete set of our texts and 
artefacts, would still struggle to understand the sorts of lives we led in virtue of 
possessing these things. I originally cast the distinction as being about the 
metaphysical make-up of a world in which knowledge is possible (Fuller 1988: 51-2), 
but the following will re-cast it as a difference in historiographical sensibility.  
 
Despite the futuristic if not science-fictional character of their thought experiments, 
Popper and MacIntyre were clearly trying to make philosophical points about our own 
world. On the one hand, Popper wanted to show that knowledge has much less to do 
with our personal make-up – either mental or physical – than epistemologists have 
normally supposed; hence, the autonomy of objective knowledge as ‘world 3’, as 
opposed to the ‘world 1’ of matter and the ‘world 2’ of belief. On the other hand, 
MacIntyre wanted to show that knowledge is so closely tied to particular practices 
that, in the absence of the skills, dispositions, sites and occasions for enacting those 
practices, texts and artefacts are no more than prosthetic corpses. While Popper’s 
thought-experiment was meant to justify the existence of ‘science’ as a distinct form 
of knowledge (albeit as a spin-off of all manner of interested, biased and error-prone 
modes of inquiry), MacIntyre’s was meant to undermine the existence of analytic 
moral philosophy (aka metaethics) for having lost touch with the ways of life that 
gave meaning to the words that now glibly tumble from philosophically trained 
mouths.  
 
In terms of the alternative philosophies of history counterposed in Karl Mannheim’s 
(1936) classic Ideology and Utopia, Popper (perhaps against type) appears to be a 
radical utopian, who sees a tomorrow that manages to retain everything good from 
today (i.e. the libraries and databases), whatever else it may contain (e.g. a different 
species of knowers), while MacIntyre is the reactionary ideologue who downgrades 
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the present for its failure to reproduce essential features of past modes of existence in 
its own practices. Although Mannheim was concerned mainly to provide a genealogy 
of the bipolar political world-views of ‘left’ and ‘right’ that emerged in the 19th 
century and continued to structure 20
th
 century debate, he acknowledged its roots in 
the ongoing tensions between what Max Weber (1963) called, respectively, the 
‘prophetic’ and ‘priestly’ modes of life in the Abrahamic religions. I am inclined to 
accept Mannheim’s general orientation here. However, I would explain it in terms of 
a distinction between an over- and under-determinationist view of history (Fuller and 
Collier 2004: chap. 6). Thus, Popper (and the utopian/prophetic mode) represents an 
overdeterminationist and MacIntyre (and the ideological/priestly mode) an 
underdeterminationist approach to history.  
 
Overdeterminationism captures a fundamental optimism in the robustness of history’s 
trajectory, such that the actual details of the past could be radically altered and most 
of what we already value would remain, or at least be available on tap. This is 
certainly the spirit in which to understand the ‘rational reconstruction’ approach to the 
history of science recommended by Popper’s follower, Lakatos (1981), who was 
comfortable both affirming a belief in scientific progress and denouncing most of the 
actual history of science. After all, to say that something could have been done more 
efficiently is not to deny that it has been done. In contrast, underdeterminationism 
reflects, if not outright pessimism, at least concern for the precariousness of all that 
we have accomplished, which requires sensitivity to and respect for our mutual 
dependence as the key to the continued survival of what humanity values. 
MacIntyre’s subsequent career certainly embodies this sensibility (e.g. MacIntyre 
1999), in which he has been joined by more postmodern theorists who stress the 
‘immanent’ over the ‘transcendent’ character of the human condition (e.g. Butler 
2004).  
 
My own considered view is that underdeterminationism – especially of the MacIntyre 
variety – dwells on the most self-debasing features of humanity’s divine heritage, 
namely, our proneness to a state of ‘nonage’, to recall Kant’s disparaging 
characterisation of those whose understanding of humanity was based on a pre-critical 
reading of the Bible, one that left the impression that we are the children of God who 
never manage to grow up. Here I prefer Kant’s rather literal and uplifting 
understanding of our divine heritage that was indicative of Enlightenment anti-
clericalism – that is, as beings created in the image and likeness of the deity, once we 
become adults, we take full responsibility for our actions without necessarily 
disowning our parentage (Fuller 2008a: chap. 7). Indeed, we act godlike in our own 
way, which for Kant amounted to inscribing a ‘view from nowhere’ in his approach to 
both theoretical and practical reason.  
 
Of special relevance here is the human significance that Kant assigned to a discipline 
that he believed had failed on its own terms to render God intelligible: theodicy, the 
justification of the world’s many specific imperfections as design features of its being 
the overall best possible world. Kant (along with many of the devout, I should add) 
found it blasphemous that theologians would try to minimize human suffering by 
claiming to speak on God’s behalf in this way. Nevertheless, theodicy provides the 
clearest precedent for our valuing all errors -- even evils -- as learning experiences en 
route to a just world order, a thesis that Kant developed in his 1784 essay, ‘Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (Neiman 2002: chap. 1). Historical 
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moments of suffering correspond to aspects of nature that, albeit suboptimal in their 
own right, somehow serve God’s global optimisation strategy. Epistemic progress 
may be thought about in a similar fashion – namely, as humanity’s temporal 
experience of God’s timeless creation, a modern update of the medieval distinction of 
ordo cognoscendi and ordo essendi: What we know historically, God wills timelessly. 
The human quest for knowledge is therefore cast as a journey to an always already 
settled place, the ‘Mind of God’. This phrase was first popularised by Aquinas’ main 
contemporary rival, Bonaventure, who penned The Mind’s Journey to God, a 
proposed curriculum for the University of Paris that anticipates late Enlightenment 
conceptions of history as humanity’s collective self-education (Fuller 2010b: chap. 8). 
 
Popper’s overdeterminationism clearly partook of Kant’s peculiar strand of optimism, 
whereby from the ashes of theodicy emerged the modern faith in progress. It testifies 
to science’s ultimate other-worldliness, its providential perseverance in the face of 
seemingly interminable resistance – not only from error and evil but also from such 
mundane ways of knowing as prejudice and common sense (Passmore 1970: chap. 
11). However, its full realization requires the removal of the cordon sanitaire that 
normally exists between historians and philosophers of science, whereby both 
disciplines agree to the principle that ‘the past is a foreign country’, separated in time 
as if by space – a poetic definition of Kuhnian ‘incommensurability’, if there ever was 
one. The cordon sanitaire allows both for historians to argue that past figures held 
beliefs suited to their times and for philosophers to argue that those same figures 
would adopt our beliefs, were they transported to our times. In that case, there is no 
reason for the present to learn from the past or the past to be humbled by the present. 
Moreover, historians and philosophers can interpret this state of mutual non-
interference (aka tolerance) to their own respective epistemic advantage. What the 
historian raises to the level of incommensurable world-views, the philosopher treats as 
remediable error. If the philosopher demotes the historian’s knowledge claim to a 
quaint piece of trivia, the historian can repay the compliment by accepting the 
philosopher’s claim as an innocuous fancy.  
 
Historians and philosophers enforce the cordon sanitaire denying figures from the 
past a full voice in their own inquiries. What I mean by a ‘full voice’ will be made 
clearer in the second half of this paper. But as a first approximation, it involves taking 
seriously that figures from the past intended their thoughts and actions to have 
purchase not only in their own lives and those of their contemporaries but ours as 
well. As it stands, both historians and philosophers treat past figures as polite 
witnesses, resulting in what I originally called, with regard to Kuhn’s (1970) 
historiography of science, a ‘double truth’ doctrine – one for historians and one for 
scientists (Fuller 2000: chap. 1). Put provocatively, historians and philosophers can 
treat themselves as ultimate truth-tellers and each other as purveyors of fiction or 
incidentals, just as long as the figures from the past common to their narratives are 
themselves only semi-realized. But once we insist on a more fully developed sense of 
the past figures that interest us, then the cordon sanitaire proves difficult to maintain 
– indeed, perhaps to such an extent that, depending on where our normative 
allegiances ultimately lie, we may need to radically revise either our disciplinary 
boundaries or our attitude to the past figures in question. In any case, the distinction 
between ‘the past’ and ‘the present’ becomes problematic. 
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Behind this point is the claim that the past is not simply something to be handled in 
some normatively pre-approved fashion – say, through the application of the relevant 
historical or philosophical methods -- but is itself constitutive of that normative 
sensibility. We may be used to saying that the cut between what counts as ‘the past’ 
and ‘the present’ is relative to the inquirer’s interests, but we rarely acknowledge that 
those past denizens under study would might balk at any such cuts, preferring instead 
to be treated as our contemporaries, even if it ends up that they provethey prove to be 
hostile witnesses in our inquiries. Thus, in the case of the historian, it is not enough 
for us to understand past figures: However well we might do that, it would seem 
pointless if these figures did not also understand us as meaningfully related to them, 
such that (at least) they see why we might find them interesting, even if they would 
not fully accept our interpretation of their ways. Similarly, for the philosopher, it is 
not enough for past figures to see the errors of their ways: They should also appreciate 
that we have been trying to make good on what they were trying to do. Only then 
would the corrections strike our visitors as more than glorified copy-editing of their 
original texts but an outright epistemic improvement on their original projects.  
 
Bluntly put, my proposal is that, as either historians or philosophers, we need to learn 
to treat denizens of the past as our contemporaries. This involves adopting a state of 
mind that in principle enables the past to change our present-day minds in ways 
sufficiently fundamental to renegotiate our relationship to the past, perhaps extending 
to the reconceptualisation of our own projects. This amounts to pushing the idea of 
‘re-enacting the past’ as far as it can go. Here it is worth recalling that, when first 
advanced by Wilhelm Dilthey as part of a ‘critique of historical reason’ at the end of 
the 19
th
 century, ‘re-enactment’ foundered because the simple assertion of humanity’s 
species unity was insufficient to underwrite a reliable method (Harrington 2001). 
However, Dilthey’s proposal is set to travel much further in the future, by virtue of 
two developments:  
(1) Increasing advances in neuroscience and their integration with 
historiography will provide a more finely grained sense of how exposure to 
particular foods and drugs, as well as people, places and artefacts, shaped the 
past’s ‘psychotropic’ environment. Even if neuroscience is never capable of 
identifying the occurrence of particular thoughts in the past, it may still give us 
access to the cognitive mood of the past, that is, the ‘spirit’ or ‘mindscape’ 
within which our forebears thought (Smail 2007).  
(2) Advances in virtual reality technologies will enable the psychotropically 
enhanced humanist to conduct the re-enactment in the presence of simulated 
versions of the relevant past figures and conditions (‘Second Life’ style) 
alongside the surviving cultural artefacts that provide the usual touchstones for 
humanistic inquiry. The verisimilitude of this endeavour may be enhanced by 
the hypothesised capacity of the brain to ‘mirror’ the experience of an action 
simply by observing it  (Turner 2007). 
Taken together, (1) and (2) are likely to elevate the pursuit of ‘historical re-enactment’ 
above armchair speculation, amateur recreation (e.g. staging past battles), or at best 
the sort of archaeological reconstruction on which the main Anglophone defence of 
re-enactment -- Robin Collingwood’s – was grounded. Instead it would become a 
generalised method of inquiry, for which humanist scholars might routinely seek 
grants to take the time to live lives like those they wish to understand, during which 
they would undergo strictures not unlike those of method acting (McCalman and 
Pickering 2010). 
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3.  Letting the Past Talk Back: The Ultimate Test of ‘Giving Voice’ 
 
Setting to one side whether the historiographical imagination is likely to be 
prosthetically enhanced in the near future, conceptual objections remain to the 
proposal that we engage in a mutual recognition exercise with denizens of the past. At 
the very least, the historian or philosopher who allows figures from the past to talk 
back is setting herself up for a fight – not least over whether her own latter-day 
inquiries are properly conceived. But if historians already imagine themselves visiting 
past figures and philosophers transporting past figures to their seminars, then what 
principle stops us from fleshing out those counterfactual interactions into give-and-
take social interactions based on jointly negotiated epistemic standards, which in turn 
might range over both the ends and the means of what we jointly agree to be 
‘knowledge’?  After all, when we call ourselves ‘Darwinian’ or, for that matter, 
‘Christian’, we are presumably not merely taking advantage of the fact that Darwin or 
Jesus is dead and hence cannot stop us for appropriating his name for our purposes. 
Rather, we imagine that he would endorse our activities done under his name by 
virtue of recognising us as amongst his legitimate heirs. In that respect, we implicitly 
invite time-travelling normative judgment, which once subject to a comprehensive 
historical re-enactment may of course result in disappointment. 
 
In particular, we tend to assume that those in the past who defended theories and 
practices that we now regard as precursors to our own forms of knowledge would 
have also defended most, if not all, of the subsequent developments that increased the 
likelihood that things would turn out as they have. Yet, this assumption is far from 
obvious and likely to be false in many cases that are important for historically 
legitimising contemporary science. For example, we continue to support Newtonian 
science in spite -- not because -- of its theological foundations, yet Newton would 
regard our efforts at interpretive charity (i.e. not holding his theology against his 
science) as condescension, if not an outright emasculation of his position (Fuller 
2010b: chap. 2). Of course, the last 300 years of the history of science has not been 
entirely a story of increasing deviation from the Newtonian norm. Physics, though 
now diminished in socio-epistemic status from its 19
th
 and 20
th
 century heyday, still 
largely aims for the sort of empirically comprehensive and mathematically unified 
conception of nature that drove Newton’s own inquiries. Indeed, even avowed atheists 
like Stephen Hawking cannot avoid Newton-inspired talk of ‘entering the mind of 
God’ to justify the increasingly esoteric speculations of cosmologists about the origins 
of the universe. 
 
To be sure, Newton might have greater difficulty reconciling himself to the history of 
biology. He would be disappointed by the eventual acceptance of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection – even in the face of objections by Whewell, Herschel 
and Mill that Darwin had failed to render the unity of nature fully intelligible. Newton 
would see this as indicative of the deviant path that history has taken from the 
methodological example he laid down in Principia Mathematica. After all, the closer 
that human cognitive powers are seen to be to those of animals, as Darwin effectively 
urged, the more mysterious Newton’s own ‘view from nowhere’ achievement 
becomes and the incentive to pursue it in the future diminishes. However, Newton 
would take heart at the influx of physics-minded scientists who, largely thanks to the 
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Rockefeller Foundation, filled the ranks of 20
th
 century genetics and later molecular 
biology – along with the nearly science of ‘biophysics’ (Rasmussen 1997). Together 
these Darwin-neutral disciplines managed to reassert the mechanical world-view, 
most recently evidenced in the rise of ‘biotechnology’. To be sure, all along their 
practitioners have had contend with Kant’s rhetorical interference, which for the past 
two centuries has driven a wedge between mechanism and teleology, to reassure first 
priests but more recently atheists that scientists are not literally in the business of 
second-guessing God’s motives.  
 
However, a time-travelling Darwin would have his own problems with the present. He 
would wonder why his name should continue to be attached to developments that so 
resolutely defy his own de-deified view of humanity, which he expressed in his 
lifetime as a general pessimism about our ability to take control of the deepest forces 
in nature, not least (as his cousin Francis Galton had proposed) through eugenics, the 
politically incorrect precursor of biotechnology. In this respect, Darwin might wish to 
dissociate himself from any of today’s ‘Neo-Darwinian’ projects that suggest that we 
can alter substantially the course of evolution. But of course, on the other hand, he 
might come to be sufficiently impressed by the biomedical advances made over the 
past century to conclude that he had radically overstated the ‘blindness’ of natural 
selection and the ‘mereness’ of its metaphorical basis in artificial selection (Fuller 
2008a: chap. 2). Indeed, Darwin may come to believe that his 19
th
 century critics were 
right, after all: A stronger case for the intelligibility of nature could be made than he 
originally thought. But such a concession to today’s science would provide only 
superficial comfort to our own contemporaries, since it leaves Darwin closer in spirit 
to intelligent design theorists, the scientific creationists who make much of the 
information-like character of the genome, something that was inconceivable to 
Darwin in his own day and was only fully fathomed in 1953 with the discovery of 
DNA’s double helix structure (Meyer 2009).  
 
The rhetorical quandaries in which a time-travelling Newton or Darwin would land 
his present-day hosts speak to the extent to which these great scientists must be 
understood as having held just the right combination of beliefs in order to provide 
legitimacy for the science we currently practice. At the same time, we have also seen 
that both Newton and Darwin could be persuaded to change their beliefs, perhaps 
quite fundamentally, in light of learning what has happened since they lived. That 
prospect is of potentially considerable normative interest, as it serves to re-negotiate 
the social contract with aspects of the past that we want to treat as our own. In that 
respect, it matters less what Newton or Darwin actually believed than what it would 
take for them to believe something else, especially something that brings them closer 
to our own beliefs. (Of course, in the spirit of dissolving the cordon sanitaire between 
history and philosophy, our time-travelling scientists may wish to persuade us that our 
supposed advances are wrong turns in disguise.)  Here we might distinguish two 
general strategies: (1) Nudging: We can get them to our position as a natural extension 
of their own position, say, by showing them advances in research to which they 
themselves contributed directly. Philosophers tend to overestimate the utility of this 
strategy by assuming that because we recognise a scientist as our precursor, she would 
recognise us as her follower. (2) Incentivising: In cases where some of our own 
position is radically at odds with some of the past scientist’s beliefs, we can try to 
persuade the scientist that our shared common ground is actually more important to 
maintain, which then provides a basis for having an interest in changing her mind.  
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4. Constructing an Alternative Future from the Past: Giving Roger Bacon Back 
His Voice 
 
A good way to understand my perspective on the philosophy of history is to see why I 
object so strongly to the following statement, which clearly expresses the post-
Kuhnian, anti-Whig sentiment – what Fuller (2000) decried as a ‘Priggish’ attitude -- 
towards the history of science that was prevalent in my graduate school days:  
Roger Bacon has often been victimized by his friends, who have exaggerated 
and distorted his place in the history of mathematics. He has too often been 
viewed as the first, or one of the first, to grasp the possibilities and promote 
the cause of modern mathematical physics. Even those who have noticed that 
Bacon was more given to the praise than to the practice of mathematics have 
seen in his programmatic statements an anticipation of seventeenth-century 
achievements. But if we judge Bacon by twentieth-century criteria and 
pronounce him an anticipator of modern science, we will fail totally to 
understand his true contributions; for Bacon was not looking to the future, but 
responding to the past; he was grappling with ancient traditions and attempting 
to apply the truth thus gained to the needs of thirteenth-century Christendom. 
If we wish to understand Bacon, therefore, we must take a backward, rather 
than a forward, look; we must view him in relation to his predecessors and 
contemporaries rather than his successors; we must consider not his influence, 
but his sources and the use to which he put them (Lindberg 1982: 3).  
The medieval historian David Lindberg is expressing what Harry Collins (1981) was 
then calling ‘methodological relativism’, which was being promoted as a renewed 
commitment to objectivity. In effect, it proposed to shift the epistemic focus of the 
historian’s role from that of constituting the object of historical inquiry (as had been 
advanced by various Neo-Hegelian and hermeneutical approaches, as well as Whig 
histories) to that of providing a context for a sympathetic hearing of the original 
historical agents (on the model of social and cultural anthropologists). Whereas the 
former presented the historian as a fellow agent – if not the dominant one – in an 
ongoing dialogue with the past, the latter presented her as an eavesdropper or silent 
witness to conversations to which she was not meant to be party (cf. Fuller 1988: 
chap. 6).  
 
At this point, I must observe that, whatever their merits, Lindberg’s claims about how 
to study Bacon formed part of a historiographical dispute that has come to lose its 
salience in the intervening three decades. A good way to see this is that two theorists 
of history who we now often see as standing together, Hayden White and Thomas 
Kuhn, would have taken opposing sides on the matter that exercised Lindberg. 
White’s stress on the narrative constitution of history – to such an extent that the 
historian is not unreasonably seen as making history her own – radicalises the 
subjective approach to the past that Lindberg opposed, whereas his own position 
corresponds to Kuhn’s stress on the historian’s ability to detach herself from present-
day scientific concerns as propaedeutic to making sense of past scientists.  
 
However, this debate over whether historical knowledge is, so to speak, subject- (e.g. 
White) or object- (e.g. Kuhn) led was displaced and the corresponding distinction 
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blurred with the onset of postmodernism in the 1980s.
1
 These two now ‘postmodern’ 
positions were seen as united against a common – albeit probably mythical – 
‘modernist’ historiographical foe, namely, one based on a strong metaphysical realism 
modelled on classical physics consisting in ‘facts of the matter’ about the past 
regardless of what anyone in the past, present or future might think. Nobody 
interested in the practice of history enthusiastically embraced this position, since it 
appeared to imply a theory of causation that committed the historian to some odious 
form of determinism. But it did provide a new basis for re-drawing the lines between 
the ‘human’ and the ‘natural’ sciences – not to mention a renewed fashion for talking 
about ‘ontology’ more generally (e.g. Hacking 2002).  
 
I wish to revisit the pre-postmodern disposition concerning the epistemology of 
history, taking the side of the subject-led approach. Consider the dreaded ‘Whig 
history’. From the standpoint of the object-led history approach championed by 
Lindberg (and Kuhn), it constitutes the object of history incorrectly because it fails to 
respect the past in its ‘pastness’. For these objectivists, ‘the past is a foreign country’ 
operates as a de facto demarcation criterion for what is eligible for historical 
investigation. Thus, despite holding a doctorate in contemporary physics, Kuhn made 
no historical inquiries into quantum mechanics or relativity theory after the 1920s 
because most of the paradigm-bounding issues that were open then remained open 
when he wrote.  Implied here is that a proper object of historical inquiry requires a 
sense of conceptual and empirical closure that is recognized by the relevant 
community of inquirers. In sociological jargon, the distinction between past and 
present is a piece of ‘disciplinary boundary maintenance’ performed by historians that 
advocates of Whig history violate by treating the past as if it were the opening act for 
the present. Unsurprisingly, the ranks of Whig history are filled with professional 
scientists who are prone to interpret professional historians of science as somehow 
trying to render the past irrelevant to current practitioners, when in fact the past is a 
ready source of examples, albeit ones often teaching negative lessons.  
 
Subject-led philosophers of history such as myself sympathize somewhat with the 
Whig historian’s bewilderment. We too see continuity between the past and the 
present, and hence reject the very idea that ‘the past is a foreign country’.  However, 
the Whig sees the continuity going only one way: She projects a line back from the 
present to -- recalling Lindberg’s example -- Roger Bacon. But of course, the line 
projected may go the other way, namely, from Roger Bacon to the future he would 
have liked to see realized. Indeed, we may decide that some version of Bacon’s 
unrealized past future would have been preferable to the actual future for which the 
Whig wishes to provide historical legitimation. In any case, the subject-led 
philosopher of history does not presume the natural legitimacy of the present in 
dictating the terms for evaluating the past. Even Hegel, who is so often read as 
justifying the Prussian status quo, never proclaimed ‘the end of history’ -- though 
Nietzsche believed that a Hegelian would need to say that at some point in time. 
Rather, Hegel held that any successful practices in one’s own day are ultimately 
means to still greater ends that in retrospect may provide a basis for ironic 
commentary on what had been truly achieved back then.  In this respect, the Whig 
jumps the Hegelian gun, presuming that we are closer to the end of history than we 
probably are. (Francis Fukuyama, call home!)  
                                                 
1
 Funkenstein’s Hegelian subject/object… 
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Given this background, let us now return to the offending passage by Lindberg. The 
nature of the offense is captured in the question: If I were Roger Bacon, would I 
appreciate being given the Lindberg treatment?  It is instructive that the figure in 
question is the mid-13
th
 century Franciscan friar Roger Bacon – someone who very 
clearly believed that his theological, philosophical and scientific views would be 
vindicated in the fullness of time, a point that Lindberg, to his credit, does not hide. 
Nevertheless, Bacon would find Lindberg’s overall portrayal of him invidious, since it 
reinforces what appears to have been a mid-13
th
 century consensus that regarded 
Bacon’s Platonically tinged declarations as relics of an approach to natural philosophy 
whose preoccupations with mathematics and astrology were rapidly being superseded 
by a generation influenced by the more earthbound concerns of the then-newly 
translated Aristotle. In other words, Bacon would regard Lindberg as reducing his 
thoughts and actions to the interpretive treatment they received at the hands of his 
contemporaries.  
 
Lindberg could try to justify this treatment, as Quentin Skinner (1969) might, arguing 
à la Wittgenstein or Austin that simply by virtue of engaging in the language game of 
mid-13
th
 century natural philosophy, Bacon implicitly agreed to have his speech and 
actions judged by the rules of that game as defined by recognisably competent 
players. Lindberg might regard this as a historiographical version of ‘natural justice’, 
as Bacon is judged by his peers (however harshly) rather than those in the future with 
whom he never had contact (however generously). But in Bacon’s defense, it could be 
argued that Lindberg’s specification of the historical context amounts to ‘micro-
Whiggery’. After all, Lindberg’s evaluative standards, while no more, are also no less 
than those upheld by a consensus of Bacon’s contemporaries. In effect, their 
utterances are presumed to be normal expressions of a shared cognitive competence, 
in terms of which Bacon’s own utterances are then treated as deviations. However, 
this presumption relies on a retrospective sense of closure about the nature of Bacon’s 
times as well as his own fate. Such closure is familiar from mid-20
th
 century social 
anthropology, which justified the ethnographer’s extended snapshot view of the tribe 
by claiming that, unlike ‘modern’ societies, the tribe’s normative horizons are 
historically ‘frozen’. This in turn conveniently circumscribed the object of inquiry so 
that the inquirer might reasonably master it without having to take any responsibility 
for it. When translated into historical practice, à la Skinner, a kind of collective 
intellectual obituary needs to be written to turn the past into a foreign country. But 
exactly how long after the original events should this mass death be declared and the 
coroner’s report issued by the attending historian?  
 
Lindberg’s methodologically convenient answer is to judge Bacon by what those of 
his own and the next generation thought of what he said and did. In that case, to 
include others whose lives did not overlap with Bacon’s would be to shift the context 
of judgment beyond what Bacon could have reasonably imagined. But is that really 
the case?  I do not believe so. On the contrary, Lindberg radically foreshortens the 
temporal horizon of intentionality: In at least the Abrahamic world, beliefs and desires 
are not normally limited to what can be realized in one’s lifetime but extend into the 
indefinite past and future. Thus, when Roger Bacon expressed the belief that the 
cosmos is constituted as a mathematical system unified under the metaphysics of 
light, he did not also believe that the truth or falsity of this belief applied only to his 
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lifetime – let alone corresponded to the judgment of the leading thinkers of his day. 
(The same, of course, could also be said of his contemporaries.)  
 
In this respect, Lindberg’s single-minded quest to capture the first-order intentional 
states of mid-13
th
 century Christian intellectuals serves to obscure their second-order 
attitudes toward those states. In effect, he renders them (with a nod to Harold 
Garfinkel) transcendental dopes – that is, only capable of generating thoughts 
designed for their immediate audience but not some larger yet to be determined 
audience who might be more receptive.  Pace Lindberg, Bacon and his interlocutors 
did not think of themselves as inhabiting a spatio-temporal island of intellectual 
communication that is available for study as a set piece. Such is a guild conceit of the 
object-led historian, borrowed partly from anthropology but also, and importantly, 
from behaviorist psychology, which black-boxed if not outright denied the mind’s 
time-spanning capacities (Fuller 1988: chap. 5). Unsurprisingly, Lindberg interprets 
Bacon’s preoccupation with the impending apocalypse -- a commonplace among 
Franciscans who followed Joachim of Fiore in reading the Bible as providing a model 
for understanding secular time -- as sufficiently pathological to excuse the house 
arrest to which Bacon was subjected later in his life. However, this is to ignore that 
both Bacon and his antagonists were generally contesting the identity of the timeless 
truth.  It was something that would only be revealed in the fullness of time, whether or 
not it conformed to Joachimite strictures – which, for the record, was not some 
passing monastic fancy but a red thread that runs through modern notions of progress, 
not least Hegel and Marx’s dialectical conceptions of history (Löwith 1948: chap. 8; 
Passmore 1970: chap. 11).
2
  
 
Here one needs to ask why someone like Bacon would leave such a voluminous 
written legacy, if he thought he was merely fighting battles with his contemporaries. 
Surely, his time would have been better spent doing things that would have made a 
more direct impression on them, whether it involved face-to-face persuasion or public 
demonstrations of empirical discoveries. To be sure, from today’s standpoint, it is 
difficult to establish that someone is a philosopher or scientist without access to a 
textual trace simply because writing is presumed to be the most reliable means of 
pinning down specific beliefs and their justification. But this guild convention of the 
historian can too easily obscure the author’s opportunity costs in having apportioned 
his life to the historian’s convenience, especially given the improbability that Bacon 
would have anticipated the existence of someone like Lindberg.  
 
This is not to say that a time-travelling Bacon would not be able to make sense of 
Lindberg’s historiography. Rather, he would marvel at the prosaic status accorded to 
an epistemic standpoint that in his own day would have been explicitly associated 
with God’s, as channelled through his angelic amanuenses. But in the next breath, 
Bacon would remind Lindberg that beyond the convenience that producing written 
works affords academic historians, it signifies his own desire for the intellectual 
contests of his lifetime to be carried forward, in which case the writings serve as 
potential scripts for extended improvised performances by future combatants. In this 
respect, Bacon’s textual trace constitutes an act of self-positioning, such so that were 
he to reappear in our midst, he would be able to identify his descendants – and not 
simply rely on others to claim him as an ancestor. Moreover, Bacon would be hardly 
                                                 
2
 Funkenstein on the need to detach apocalypse from eschatology (PhD on Lowith) 
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idiosyncratic in trying to gamegaming the transcendent character of writing: Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck was another figure whose rhetorical strategy appeared to write off 
his contemporaries in favour of a more sympathetic future audience (Burkhardt 1970). 
 
What makes my own anti-Lindberg position non-Whiggish is that I do not presume 
for a moment that Bacon would choose as his descendants those who claim him as a 
noble ancestor. Moreover, by reconstructing Bacon’s position as a normative standard 
against which to judge the subsequent history of science – a feat tantamount to 
method-acting the role of Bacon for the contemporary stage – we have an opportunity 
to explore how, say, his commitment to the metaphysics of light might have got us 
quicker, say, to today’s quantum information theory, not to mention other yet-to-be-
discovered phenomena. Here Bacon would enjoy the advantage of being someone 
who held optics to be the foundational physical science, but without having been 
encumbered by the actual institutional history of science, not least one Isaac Newton, 
whose paradigm-defining work failed to account for nature of light to anyone’s long-
term satisfaction.  
 
My historiographical proposal entails that we engage in ‘rational reconstruction’ of 
the past -- but in exactly the way that Imre Lakatos (1981) thought was not possible, 
namely, to project an alternative future from a discarded past. (Lakatos, in contrast, 
retrojected an alternative, cognitively streamlined past from the present as given.) I 
have called this approach retro-futurism (Fuller 2010b: chap. 9). It is clearly related to 
the ‘alternate history’ scenarios that populate the plots of science fiction. Therefore it 
should come as no surprise that the approach was originally championed by H.G. 
Wells in his failed bid to be appointed to the first chair in sociology at the London 
School of Economics (and the UK) in 1907 (Fuller 2011: chap. 1; cf. Lepenies 1988: 
chap. 5). Wells’ definition of sociology as the ‘science of utopias’ does not seem so 
odd if we imagine, as Wells did, that the great 19
th
 century prototypes for sociology 
put forward by Comte, Marx and Spencer proposed various social innovations in 
order to draw alternative futures from inchoate tendencies in human history. While 
academic sociology ended up not rising to Wells’ challenge, it remains a worthy one 
to which STS’s radical constructivist take on the modal structure of historical reality 
naturally lends itself. 
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